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NOTES
PLEADING UNDER THE CONSOLIDATED
LARCENY STATUTE
One of the most difficult and perplexing tasks in criminal prosecution is the drawing of an indictment or information sufficient to
secure a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses.' Much
injustice and unnecessary litigation have resulted from reversals because of the intricacies of pleading in relation to this crime. 2 One
element of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses is that
the wrongdoer must have obtained both possession and title to the
personal property of another by fraud.3 This injects into a criminal
proceeding all the uncertainties of the law of sales with respect to the
intent of the owner to pass title.
The question examined by this note is whether the difficulties in
pleading have been alleviated by statutes consolidating the crimes
of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by false pretenses.
The indictment in a recent Florida case, 4 in which the defendant was
charged with larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses, included a separate count spelling out all the elements of the latter
offense. It is submitted that a single general allegation would suffice
under the consolidated statute.5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The fact that wrongful appropriation of property is generally
covered by the three related but distinct crimes of larceny, obtaining
property by false pretenses, and embezzlement is a consequence of
of the legal history of England. Larceny, the first of these crimes to
be created, was primarily designed to protect society from breaches of
the peace; thus unless there was a trespass in the taking, or an interference with possession, there was no larceny. 6 The English courts
'See, e.g., Clifton v. State, 76 Fla. 244, 79 So. 707 (1918); Pruitt v. State, 75 Fla.
448, 78 So. 425 (1918).
2See, e.g., Ex parte Stirrup, 155 Fla. 173, 19 So.2d 712 (1944); Jones v. State, 22
Fla. 532 (1886); Pendry v. State, 18 Fla. 181 (1881); Ladd v. State, 17 Fla. 215 (1879);
People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 502, 13 N.E. 525 (1887).
3E.g., Courtney v. State, 174 Miss. 147, 164 So. 227 (1935); People v. Noblett, 244
N.Y. 355, 155 N.E. 670 (1927); Loomis v. People, 67 N.Y. 322 (1878); Smith v. People,
53 N.Y. (8 Sick.) 111 (1873).
4
Scales v. State, 83 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1955).
5FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1955).
61 MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw §109 (1934); Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6
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gradually extended the scope of common law larceny until it included
situations in which it was very difficult to find a trespass. The most
notable extension was larceny by trick, in which the wrongdoer gains
possession of another's property through fraudulently obtained consent.7
Since the English courts refused to further extend the crime of
larceny, Parliament passed statutes creating the crimes of embezzlement s and obtaining property by false pretenses. 9 Embezzlement related to situations in which the wrongdoer obtained lawful possession
and later converted the property to his own use; obtaining property
by false pretenses covered the offense of obtaining both possession
and title by fraud. Both of these crimes were imported into the
United States, along with their complex forms of pleading.
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The problems arising from intricate pleadings continued in this
country. By clever manipulation of pleading technicalities, defendants
were afforded an almost unlimited opportunity to escape or postpone
their just punishment. Recognizing this, the legislatures of several
states enacted statutes combining larceny, obtaining property by
false pretenses, and embezzlement into one crime, 10 termed "theft"
in some states" and "larceny" in others.12 The purpose of these
statutes is to simplify pleading.13 Most of them provide language of a
general nature as a legally sufficient charge for any one of the three
crimes. 14 For example, the Florida statute provides:'r
HARV. L. Rv.

244, 245 (1892).

7Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779); Beale, supra note 6, at 248.
839 GEO. 3, c. 85 (1799).
930 GEo. 2, c. 24 (1757).
1oE.g., Ayiz. CODE ANN. §43-5501 (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE §§484, 490a, 952
(Deering 1949); LA. CODE CuM. LAW & PROc. ANN. art. 740-67 (Dart 1943); MAss.
ANN. LAWS C. 266, §30, c. 277, §39 (1932); MINN. STAT. §622.01 (1953); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. §94-2701 (1947); N.Y. PEN. CODE §§1290, 1290a; WASH. REv. CoDv
§9.54.010 (1951).
"lE.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§484, 490a, 952 (Deering 1949).
12E.g., FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1955); MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 266, §30, C. 277, §39 (1932).
13E.g., State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d,368 (1944); Commonwealth v. Kelley,
184 Mass. 320, 68 N.E. 346 (1903).
14CAL. PEN. CODE §952 (Deering 1949); LA. CODE CRIM. LAW & PROC. ANN. art.
245 (Dart 1943); MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 277, §41 (1932).
'15FLA. STAT. §811.021 (5) (1955).
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"It shall be sufficient for any indictment, information or
warrant returned, filed or issued under this section to charge
generally that the defendant at the time and in the county specified, did steal the personal property, thing in action, evidence
of debt or contract or article of value out of which the prosecution arose, describing the same in general terms and alleging
generally the ownership and value thereof."
Some states refuse to concede that any pleading reform has been
effected. New York, for example, has held that a conviction under
a general charge of larceny, as provided by the consolidated statute, 1
would not be upheld if the evidence showed the defendant guilty of
one of the other included crimes.17 The reason for this position, as
spelled out in People v. Dumar,8 is that when any one of several acts
constitutes a particular crime the defendant is not fully informed of
the nature of the charge against him unless the indictment charges
the particular offense relied upon for conviction. Several other states
follow this strict interpretation. 9
Other courts have taken the position that a general charge in the
language of the statute will suffice to uphold a conviction if the evidence establishes that the defendant is guilty of any one of the included crimes. 20 As pointed out by the Massachusetts court, the
statute in no way varies the necessary elements of proof.2 1 The Louis-

iana Supreme Court, referring to the consolidated statute of that state,
said:

22

"[Tihe Legislature sought to denounce under the single heading
of 'theft' all of the crimes that it considered constituted the
culpable taking of anything of value belonging to another,
'nN.Y. PEN. CODE §528.

27E.g., People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 155 N.E. 670 (1927); People v. Dumar, 106
N.Y. 502, 13 N.E. 325 (1887).
28106 N.Y. 502, 13 N.E. 325 (1887).
2OE.g., State v. Smith, 2 Wash. 2d 118, 98 P.2d 647 (1939); State v. Friend, 47
Minn. 449, 450, 50 N.W. 692, 693 (1891) (dictum).
20E.g., People v. Nor Woods, 37 Cal.2d 584, 233 P.2d 897 (1951); People v.
Fewkes, 214 Cal. 142, 4 P.2d 538 (1931); People v. Brock, 21 Cal. App. 2d 601, 70
P.2d 210 (1937); State v. Smith, 210 La. 891, 28 So.2d 487 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 106 N.E. 150 (1914); see Note, 53 HARV. L. REv. 122, 127

(1939).
21Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320, 68 N.E. 346 (1903).
-2State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 1090, 20 So.2d 368, 372 (1944).
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whether such taking was without the consent of the owner, commonly known as larceny, or the taking with his consent, as is
the case in confidence games, embezzlement, and false pretenses.
This is in accordance with the modem trend, followed in numerous states, of simplifying the law by discarding ancient and
outmoded forms and defining offenses to prevent confusion and
injustices."
Convictions under statutes construed in this light have been upheld
against the objection that the defendant is not fully informed of the
nature of the charge against him unless he has notice of the particular
crime relied upon for conviction. 23 Courts adhering to this view say
that the defendant's rights are fully protected by a provision for a bill
of particulars.2 4
The Florida Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the
question of the sufficiency of a general charge under the consolidated
statute. The fact that the old statute on obtaining property by false
pretenses remains on the books25 makes it difficult to predict what its
position will be. There is much room for argument that the old statute has been repealed by implication2 and should be removed by
legislative action. In the original bill the Legislature clearly expressed an intention to simplify pleading; 27 it also set out specific
statutes that were not to be affected by the new law, and the old false
pretense statute is not among those listed. 28 The maximum period of
imprisonment for any violation of the old statute 29 is twice that pro2

3E.g., People v. Plum, 88 Cal. App. 575 (1928); State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20
So.2d 368 (1944); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320, 68 N.E. 346 (1903).
24E.g., State v. Pete, supra note 23; Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra note 23;
FLA. STAT. §811.021 (5) (1955), "This section shall not be construed as intending
to interfere with the power of the court to require the state to furnish the defendant
with a bill of particulars in proper cases . ."; FLA. STAT. §906.07 (1955).
25FLA. STAT. §817.01 (1955).
26Cf. Sparkman v. State ex rel. Bank of Ybor City, 71 Fla. 210, 71 So. 34 (1916).
27S. JoUR. 27 (Fla. 1951): "An act to define larceny, to define and describe per-

sonal property which may be the subject of larceny; to define, prescribe, establish,
and describe the method, manner, and means whereby and by which a person
shall be deemed guilty of larceny; to prescribe the sufficiency and essentials of a
warrant, indictment and information charging larceny; to provide for a bill of
particulars; to provide for and prescribe the punishment which may be imposed
for the commission of the offense of larceny..
28FLA. STAT. §811.021 (6) (1955).
29Ten years in state prison. This statute presumably includes any amount,
however slight.
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vided for a conviction of grand larceny under the consolidated statute.30 Hence a defendant suspected of obtaining property by false
pretenses is subject to the whim of the prosecutor, who may now
prosecute under either statute.
In conclusion, the provision for a general charge under the consolidated statute is in keeping with the modem trend toward streamlining indictments and informations in order that the trial may proceed speedily to a decision on the merits. In keeping with the purpose
for which the statute was enacted, Florida prosecutors should be able
to employ the general charge to the same advantage as is done in
California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, the states chiefly responsible
for the position that a general allegation with respect to any one of
the crimes embodied in the statute is sufficient for pleading purposes.
HENRY F. MARTIN, JR.

GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
BILLBOARD ADVERTISING
Outdoor advertising is a big business, firmly entrenched and well
organized. It has unquestionably made a real contribution to the
opening of mass markets, upon which our economy is dependent. Like
other behemoths of commerce, however, its development has not been
hailed by everyone. The very number of billboards is bound to offend
some; there are hundreds of thousands in the nation, ranging in
size from Burma Shave jingles to the multi-thousand-dollar sparkling
displays on the Miami bay front.
There is an attempt, fairly successful among members of the organized industry, at self-regulation. One of the rules in the Outdoor
Advertising Association code of ethics' is "to refuse to display any
misleading, indecent or illegitimate advertising or any advertising
which savors of personal animosity." Bylaws of the association are
rigid on the subject of location. Members are not permitted to place
billboards
3oFLA. STAT. §811.021 (1955) (offense divided into petit and grand larceny.
Maximum punishment for former, 6 months in county jail or fine not exceeding
$300; for latter, 5 years in state penitentiary or fine not exceeding $1,000).
IOUTDOOR ADVERTISING: THE MoDERN MARKETING FORCE 209 (1928).
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